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Takeovers in the Boardroom: Burke versus Schumpeter
Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman*

We are delighted to participate in a 25th anniversary assessment of Martin
Lipton’s 1979 article, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom.1 This is a remarkably
prescient article that demonstrates an uncanny ear for an emerging issue. From his
vantage point inside targets’ boardrooms -- and, we assume, also from inside the nearby
offices of investment bankers -- Lipton spotted a gathering storm on the horizon and
sought to channel the emerging issue of takeover policy in a direction that accorded with
his own fundamental convictions as well as the interests of his clients. As every
academic knows, early intervention is the surest way to influence the path of a debate.
And as Lipton’s career-long commitment to scholarship demonstrates, he has always had
a good bit of the academic in him.
We begin by examining the worldview behind Takeover Bids. What exactly did
Lipton see from the windows of boardrooms on the upper floors of New York
skyscrapers? When viewed in its original setting, we believe, Lipton’s article gives rise
to a profound irony. Takeovers Bids \ reflects a deep disquiet with the market for
corporate control. It is a Burkean take on a messy Schumpeterian world that, during
1980s, reached its apex in Drexel Burnham’s democratization of finance through the junk
bond market. But the irony is that today, long after the Delaware Supreme Court has
adopted many of Lipton’s views, there is a new market for corporate control that no
longer poses the threats – or supports the opportunities – that the market of the 1980s
created. Today’s strategic bidders and their targets share the same boardroom views.
And for precisely this reason, “just say no” is no longer the battle cry that it once was. It
stirred the crowds in the past precisely because hostile takeovers could be credibly
depicted as a sweeping threat to the status quo – a claim that no one would make about
today’s strategic bidders.
Today’s hostile bidders no longer possess the disruptive Schumpeterian spirit of
1980s that animated the early purveyors of, to use Lipton’s phrase, “two-tier, front-endloaded, boot-strap, bust-up, junk-bond, hostile tender offers.”2 The market for corporate
control today is a process of peer review, rather than an instrument of systemic change.
What is lost as a result is just what, in the conservative view, has been gained: the
capacity of the market for corporate control to ignite the dynamism that in our view has
served the U.S. economy so well.
*
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1
Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101 (1979) [hereinafter Takeover
Bids].
2
See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Mergers: Past, Present and Future 3 (Jan. 10, 2001),
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/comp/ma/guest_column/lipton_merger.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).

We undertake our assessment of Lipton’s boardroom view with trepidation. We
are reminded of a scene in the movie, Annie Hall, in which Woody Allen and Diane
Keaton, waiting in line to see The Sorrow and the Pity, become a captive audience for a
self-important bore intent on impressing his date by loudly lecturing her on Marshall
McLuhan’s work. In fulfillment of all of our fantasies, Marshall McLuhan then appears
himself to tell the self-anointed expert that he has got it all wrong. We run an analogous
risk in this essay. We fully expect Lipton to disagree with much of what we say about his
views, and we will even forego the post-modern defense that the readers, not the author,
are the final arbiters of a work’s meaning.3 Instead, we resort to a lesson from cognitive
psychology (a discipline Lipton has viewed positively in the past4), namely, that our
current positions powerfully shape our recollections of the past – or, put differently,
where we were yesterday depends on where we are today.
In the discussion that follows, Part I places Takeover Bids in its historical context.
Part II then tracks the post-Takeover Bids development of Delaware takeover law, with
particular emphasis on the ongoing dialogue between the Delaware Supreme Court and
the Chancery Court, which we characterize as a continuing debate between conservatism
and pragmatism. Finally, Part III assesses where takeover law now stands, and resurrects
our perennial optimism that the Chancery Court’s pragmatism will ultimately prevail
over the Supreme Court’s ideology. We conclude, however, that although Lipton may
still lose today’s battle to allow targets to just say no to intra-establishment takeovers, he
will still have won the larger war. For now, at least, boardrooms are insulated from much
of the force of a truly Schumpeterian market in corporate control of the sort we briefly
glimpsed during the 1980s.
I. Lipton’s Counter-Revolutionary Manifesto
The world was a very different place in 1979, the year that Takeover Bids was
published. The economy was just emerging from a decade of dismal performance.
Interest rates were high (although they would soon go higher), and the Dow was still
below 900. Hostile takeovers were increasing, albeit gradually, as they had since 1974,
the first year in which a prominent investment bank advised an acquirer in a hostile
takeover.5 Drexel had not yet begun to finance takeovers with junk bonds, and the poison
pill had yet to be invented. But many of the players who would come to dominate the
3

We note, however, that the use of scholarship by courts makes the post-modern position descriptively
accurate, as we learned from the Delaware Supreme Court’s changing utterly the meaning of our term
“substantive coercion.” Compare Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate
Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW 247 (1989)
with Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.1990). Vice Chancellor Strine
has noted the disconnect between our definition of the term and the manner in which the Supreme Court
has used it, despite the court’s acknowledgment of the source of the phrase. See Chesapeake Corp. Shore,
2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20 (2000).
4
Martin Lipton & Paul Rowe, Polls, Pills and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J.CORP. L.
1, 23-24 (2002).
5
Morgen-Stanley advised International Nickel Company of Canada on its acquisition of ESB. Ron
Chernow, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE
596 (1990).
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hostile financial deals of the next decade were already active, including T. Boone
Pickens, Ronald Perelman, Felix Rohaytn, Joseph Flom, and, of course, Martin Lipton.6
In Takeover Bids, Lipton recognized – perhaps more clearly than anyone else at
the time – just how important the takeover phenomenon would become during the next
decade. Takeover Bids also articulated the central features of a deeply conservative, even
Burkean, view of hostile takeovers, which appears to have informed much of what Lipton
has written -- and the Wachtell, Lipton firm has stood for -- during the ensuing twentyfive years.
In our view, Takeover Bids should be read as a bold manifesto for the committed
rather than as a cautious argument to convince the agnostic. But as a call to arms, it has
proven to be more potent than any ordinary law review article could hope to be.
Although Takeover Bids makes many particular arguments, its core is contained in a
paragraph that occurs early in the article:
It would not be unfair to pose the policy issue [of whether to
permit boards to oppose hostile bids] as: whether the long-term interests of
the nation’s corporate system and economy should be jeopardized in order
to benefit speculators interested not in the vitality and continued existence
of the business enterprise in which they have bought shares, but only in a
quick profit on the sale of those shares? The overall health of the
economy should not in the slightest degree be made subservient to the
interests of certain shareholders in realizing a profit on a takeover. (Italics
in original)7
The striking feature of this perspective is that it is at once abstract and
deeply conservative. Nothing less than the health of the entire economic system
is at stake. But what is the mechanism by which takeovers jeopardize the health
of the economic system? How do speculators and raiders acquiring less than one
percent of U.S. public companies in hostile deals (and far less than one percent in
19798) threaten the entire economic system? We suspect that Takeover Bids
describes a mechanism just clearly enough to inform those who need to know -but not quite so clearly as to invite critique.

6

The early players in the mid-1970s world of hostile takeovers are described retrospectively in Chernow,
supra note 5, at 596-603; the same world is described contemporaneously in Steven Brill, The Tough
Lawyers in the Tender-Offer Game, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, June 21, 1976, at 52-61. Lincoln Caplan
recounts that the legendary rivalry between Wachtell, Lipton and Skadden, Arps can be traced to their first
encounter on opposite sides of a proxy contest in 1959. Lincoln Caplan, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND
THE RISE OF A LEGAL EMPIRE 59 (1993).
7
Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 104. This paragraph contains the article’s only italicized sentence.
8
There were only seventy-three successful contested tender offers in which the target was a public
company and either the target or the acquirer was listed on the New York or American Stock Exchanges
during the entire 1970s. Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, The Returns to Acquiring Firms in Tender
Offers: Evidence from Three Decades, FIN. MGMT, Aug. 1989, at 15.
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Consider first how hostile takeovers do not endanger the economy. They do
not threaten the economic system by harming shareholders or raising the costs of
outside equity capital (although Lipton argues that they may harm long-term
shareholders). Indeed, Takeover Bids reiterates at several points that the case for
allowing boards to defeat hostile bids does not turn centrally on the consequences
for shareholder interests.9
Nor does it seem likely that Lipton’s vision of a threat to the economy could
have been rooted in the direct costs that hostile bids might impose on corporate
stakeholders other than shareholders. Accepting for the moment that significant
harm occurs, as Lipton argues,10 the numbers of deals were much too small to
have economy-wide consequences during the 1970s. Since we doubt that Lipton
was exaggerating his concerns, harm to stakeholders couldn’t have been their
principal source. Moreover, if stakeholder interests had been key to Lipton’s
concerns, takeover policy would not have been the answer. The problem would
have been management opportunism vis-à-vis stakeholders, and the remedy
would been to curb the power of all boards, acquirers and targets alike, to
restructure companies at the expense of their stakeholders. For this purpose, it
matters little to employees whether they are fired by incumbent management or
by ahostile bidder.
What, then, is there about hostile takeovers that could shake corporate
capitalism to its foundations, even before the takeover surge of the 1980s? The
answer, Takeover Bids suggests, is the demoralizing effects of takeovers on
corporate managers and directors.
At least two forms of perverse incentives arising from takeover pressures are
discussed in Takeover Bids. One is that managers who fear takeovers might no
longer engage in serious long-term planning,11 apparently out of concern that their
plans might be lost in a hostile takeover or, worse yet, end up lining the pockets of
a raider. The other is that an uncontrolled takeover market would dissipate a
boardroom sense of social responsibility that had slowly accreted over the
previous five decades of legal and social evolution. Faced with an apparent
endorsement of takeovers, directors would conclude that the law’s ultimate value
was market price and the interests of speculators, rather than the responsible
treatment of stakeholders or good corporate governance more generally.12 Put
differently, the real costs of open takeovers would accrue not in the minority of
companies that were actually acquired but through a pervasive change of values
and temporal perspective within the boardrooms of the vast majority of
companies that were notacquired.13
9

See, e.g., Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 115, 119-20.
The empirical evidence would cause one to be skeptical of the factual claim. See RONALD J. GILSON &
BERNARD BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS ch. 13 (2d ed. 1995).
11
See Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 109, 115.
12
Id. at 119.
13
Here Lipton is making the same kind of general deterrence argument that is proffered by pro-takeover
advocates except that for Lipton the externality is negative.
10
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In short, Takeover Bids was a call to arms in the defense of an economic
order built on the honor, perspicuity, and civility of the officers and directors of
America’s corporations. The system and its concomitant culture had developed
organically over the preceding five decades.14 In Lipton’s view, it had functioned
well to ensure that America’s corporate resources were invested rationally, and
that the proceeds of growth were distributed equitably between shareholders and
stakeholders. Now, however, the system was put at risk by “ad hoc consortiums”
of selling shareholders who, although they might purport to exercise choice, were
actually manipulated by raiders and speculators. The danger was not that every
company would fall to raiders, but that America’s top managers would lose their
vocation as trustees and descend to the short-sighted, cut-throat capitalism of the
raiders. And worse yet, this process of erosion was being legitimated by empty
slogans, such as “shareholder choice.”
It is not hyperbolic to call Takeover Bids “Burkean” because, like Edmund
Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France,15 it is an impassioned defense of
ancient regime authored by a powerful mind. And like Reflections on the
Revolution in France, Takeover Bids is remarkably prescient, published several
years before the full import of the takeover revolution became obvious. Nor do
the similarities end there. Where Burke celebrates the French monarchy,
aristocracy16 and clergy as the architects of France’s prosperity, Lipton celebrates
the moral and economic leadership of America’s CEOs, board members, and
investment bankers. Where Burke decries stock jobbers, speculators, and mobs,
Lipton’s targets are raiders, speculators, and “ad hoc consortiums” of
shareholders. And where Burke rejects “popular election” as “the sole lawful
source of authority,”17 Lipton rejects shareholder choice as the sole basis for
deciding the outcome of hostile tender offers. Even the short-term perspective
and lack of attachment to particular companies that Lipton sees as characteristic
of raiders and arbitrageurs resembles Burke’s earlier critique of France’s
revolutionary leaders.18
Finally, like Burke, Lipton never shrank from criticizing the philosophes
of the academy. Although Henry Manne’s work19 is not mentioned explicitly in
14

The five-decade time span suggests that the origin of the system was in the reforms of New Deal
legislation in Lipton’s view, although Takeover Bids does not make this explicit.
15
Edmund Burke, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Frank M. Turner ed., 2003) (1790).
16
Of the French aristocracy threatened by the Revolution, Burke observes:
Of my best observation, compared with my best inquiries, I found [the French] nobility
for the greater part composed of men of high spirit, and of a delicate sense of honour,
both with regard to themselves individually, and with regard to their whole corps, over
whom they kept, beyond what is common in other countries, a censorial eye.
Id. at 115.
17
Id. at 23.
18
Of the French revolutionary leaders, Burke observes, “The attachment to their country itself is only so far
as it agrees with some of their fleeting projects; it begins and ends with that scheme of polity which falls in
with their momentary opinion.” Id. at 75.
19
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
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Takeover Bids -- and Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, 20 Lucian Bebchuk,21
and one of us22 -- had not yet written our first articles on the market for corporate
control, some aspects of the economic case for an open takeover market were
already familiar when Takeover Bids was published.
A well-known article by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel published
two years after Takeover Bids23 is the best counterpoint to Lipton’s article.
Although Easterbrook and Fischel’s contribution was far more linear and
analytical than Lipton’s (in the fashion of the philosophes), its abstract approach
and systemic claims matched Lipton’s level of discourse perfectly. As modern
philosophes to Lipton’s Burkean rhetoric, Easterbrook and Fischel emphasized
managerial agency costs as the central problem of corporate governance, and
embraced the hostile takeover as the market’s ultimate disciplinary tool. Far from
demoralizing officers and directors, however, the risk of a takeover on this view
serves to discipline them and minimize agency losses that shareholders would
otherwise bear. The legal implication is boards should have no discretion to
respond to hostile takeovers – the mirror image of the legal conclusion that Lipton
reached. And, as in Takeover Bids, the justification was systemic. What mattered
for Easterbrook and Fischel was not the quality of individual takeover bids, but
the implications of takeover policy for the market as a whole and, in particular,
for the incentives of raiders to discover poorly managed companies and the
incentives of managers to maximize shareholder value to avoid a hostile bid.
Of course, Lipton’s rhetorical struggle with modern philosophes has a
different ending than Burke’s struggle with the defenders of the French
Revolution. Burke’s views did not prevail (at least in France), while, as we argue
below, Lipton succeeded in blunting the revolutionary edge of hostile takeovers
that first appeared in the 1970s and early 1980s. Moreover, Lipton succeeded,
we will argue, precisely because he was able to best the philosophes on their own
turf, by casting the issue of defensive tactics as a matter of general principle, to be
decided on the basis of system-wide costs and benefits. On this view, we must
choose to trust boards or shareholders, market prices or internal evaluations,
CEOs or raiders. Neither Lipton’s approach nor its mirror image, the systemic
analysis of Easterbrook and Fischel, left much room to discriminate among hostile
takeovers and defensive tactics. The logic of Lipton’s position was to preclude all
hostile bids; the thrust of Easterbrook and Fischel’s was to preclude none, at least
when the bid price exceeded the market price of the target’s stock. In this sense,
both Lipton and the philosophes abandoned the particularistic, fact-sensitive
analysis that is the hallmark of Delaware corporate law in other contexts. And
precisely by diverting the debate outside the usual plane of analysis in Delaware
20

Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
21
Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982).
22
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1982).
23
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20.
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corporate law, Lipton (with the unintended aid of the philosophes) won an
enormous rhetorical advantage. If the only alternatives were those presented by
Takeover Bids and Easterbrook and Fischel respectively, Delaware’s choice – and
America’s choice – was never even close.24

II. Takeovers in the Boardroom and the Courts: Ideology versus Pragmatism
If, as we argue, Takeover Bids made a Burkean claim that takeovers erode the
foundations of the U.S. economy, it is hardly surprising that its argument does not require
a close parsing of the experiences of particular takeover battles. Indeed, it is striking how
little the facts about individual control contests and their consequences matter to Lipton’s
position. As Lipton put it, “even if there were no real evidence, but only suspicion, that
proscribing the ability of companies to defend against takeovers would adversely affect
long-term planning and thereby jeopardize the economy, the policy considerations in
favor of not jeopardizing the economy are so strong that not even a remote risk is
acceptable.”25 Moreover, the paucity of factual detail did not handicap Lipton’s efforts to
shape the development of Delaware takeover law. As is well-known, Lipton’s
conservative ideology ultimately prevailed in the Delaware Supreme Court, albeit not
without creating a tension between the Supreme Court and the Chancery Court that
survives in Delaware corporate law to this day.
Matters didn’t start out this way, or at least they didn’t seem to. In the beginning,
the Supreme Court’s approach to the modern wave of hostile takeovers seemed to be
more pragmatic and fact sensitive than based on abstract principles and systemic
reasoning. But appearances are deceiving. The nice irony of the history is that the intercourt tension seems to have grown out of the fact that in Unocal the Supreme Court
sandbagged Chancery. Unocal instructed Chancery that the lawfulness of takeover
defenses depends on the facts by inviting it to examine the nature of the “threat” posed by
a hostile offer and the proportionality of the target’s defensive response.26 But when the
Chancery Court developed a takeover jurisprudence based on a fact-sensitive
investigation, the Supreme Court announced that the facts mattered very little. Instead,
matters such as the possible confusion of target shareholders and as the disruption of the
incumbent board’s business strategy were threats sufficient to support preclusive
takeover defenses.27 By this point, however, the die was cast. Having been repeatedly
exposed to the facts, the Chancery Court could not ignore the reality of the transactions
before it. Simply deferring to the Supreme Court’s post-Unocal embrace of managerial
discretion and Liptonian ideology was no longer completely possible.
As we suggested in Part I, Takeovers Bids anticipated the new class of bidders
that would dominate the market for corporate control in the 1980s. Unocal provided the
24

Lipton’s attack on the philosophes continues to the present. See Client Letter from Martin Lipton, No
Substitute for Good Judgment, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (March 24, 2005).
25
Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 104-05.
26
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3.
27
See, e.g., Paramount Communications , Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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Delaware Supreme Court its first opportunity to confront the new wave of hostile
takeovers, fittingly an effort by T. Boone Pickens to profit by restricting an oil company’s
misuse of free cash flow.
The court acted against the background of what had become a heated debate.28
Takeover defense lawyers advanced the position championed by Lipton in Takeover Bids.
Board decisions with respect to hostile takeovers should be treated like any other
acquisition proposal: the business judgment rule should operate to allocate the decisionmaking role to directors. As Lipton put it, “[o]nce the directors have properly determined
that a takeover should be rejected they may take any reasonable action to accomplish this
purpose.”29 Like the business judgment rule, the court’s deference to managers derives
from broad principle, not from the particular defensive tactic or the takeover.
Academics took the opposite side of the argument. Lipton would accord target
management deference to defeat a takeover because stability encouraged proper
management conduct; academics would restrict that discretion because from their
perspective, hostile takeovers played a disciplinary role. “Speculators” could displace
both bad managers and managers who stood in the way of economic change. Depending
on the individual academic, the philosophe position was that target managers should
either be passive – the Easterbrook and Fischel position we revisited in Part I – or that
these managers should seek out a better deal.30 In the end, however, the dominant
academic position accorded shareholders the final decision with respect to a takeover
proposal, which, like Lipton’s analysis, was a position based on broad principle and
systemic effects.
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court took the middle path, appearing to reject
a resolution of the issue based on abstract principle by allocating decision-making
responsibility neither entirely to shareholders nor entirely to managers. Rather, the court
adopted a proportionality test geared to the facts. The Chancery Court was directed to
determine whether the particular hostile bid presented a threat – was there a real danger
or was the board simply parroting Lipton’s litany of possible concerns? If there was a
threat, was management’s defensive response proportional to the threat – a balance that
presumably turned on the details of the particular threat and defensive response
As originally framed, the trial court was cast as the final arbitrator between good
and bad defensive tactics, making a substantive judgment concerning the presence of a
threat and the proportionality of the response rather than simply deferring to the board’s
or shareholders’ decision based on abstract principle.31 The balance called for the
28

Ronald J. Gilson, UNOCAL Fifteen Years Later (and what we can do about it), 26 DEL. J.CORP. L. 491,
493-97 (2001)
29
Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at 123.
30
See Gilson, supra note 22; Bebchuk, supra note 21.
31
In hindsight, we might have read Unocal a little more closely. The Supreme Court was explicit in
rejecting Easterbrook & Fischel’s passivity principle—it was not, the court stated forcefully, the law of
Delaware. In contrast, the court was kinder to Lipton, rejecting his broad principle implicitly rather than
explicitly as with Easterbrrok and Fischel, and referring favorably to Lipton’s catalogue of possible threats.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 964, 955 & n.10 (Del. 1985).
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exercise of a pragmatism informed by experience. The business judgment rule is
premised in significant part on the fact that the balance of experience on day-to-day
affairs broadly favors the institutional competency of the board over that of the court;
deference does not depend on the circumstances of the particular case. In hostile
takeovers, however, that balance was reversed. The Chancery Court saw a great many
more transactions than could any single board and, in addition, there was a problem of
self-interest. For these reasons deference would depend on a careful parsing of the facts.
To be sure, one could (and we did) have a healthy skepticism whether the
Supreme Court really meant what it seemed to say in Unocal. Shortly after Unocal, we
followed Lipton’s choice of journals and wrote an article for the Business Lawyer that
asked whether there was “substance to proportionality review.”32 Ever the optimists, we
outlined how the Chancery Court might operationalize Unocal’s seemingly pragmatic
premise that, once immersed in the facts, the court could distinguish between good and
bad defensive tactics.
For a time, that optimism seemed appropriate. In a series of cases highlighted by
Anderson, Clayton,33 Interco,34 and Pillsbury,35 the Chancery Court developed a doctrinal
framework that took Unocal’s call for a pragmatic balance seriously, both at the level of
the threat and at the level of the proportionality test. In Anderson, Clayton, the court
concluded that a defensive response that coerced shareholders was not proportional to a
hostile bid that did not. In Interco and Pillsbury, blocking an offer, in contrast to
providing shareholders with a better alternative, was not proportional to the threat that
shareholders would differ with management’s assessment of the price offered in the
hostile bid – what the Supreme Court would come inaccurately to call “structural
coercion.”
The central feature of the Chancery Court’s conception of proportionality review
was its fealty to Unocal’s apparent rejection of abstract principle in favor of
particularized fact finding. Was the hostile offer coercive? Did target management’s
response seek “to explore or create alternatives or attempt to negotiate on the
shareholders’ behalf”?36 The result was the development of a pragmatic takeover
jurisprudence in the Chancery Court that proved extremely difficult to suppress.
Pragmatism was the only plausible response if the trial judge was to take seriously what
was being presented in the courtroom. Only a commitment to Lipton’s abstract ideology,
not dependent on “real evidence but only on suspicion,”37 could cause a court to credit,
for example, Bruce Wasserstein’s ratchet valuations in Interco,38 or the breadth of his

32

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is
There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247 (1989).
33
A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
34
City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
35
Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
36
City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799-800 (Del. Ch. 1988).
37
Takeover Bids, supra note 1, at __.
38
Interco, 551 A.2d at 729-93, 798-99.
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valuation of the post-transaction Time Warner.39 A blanket license to “just say no” in
response to an unsupported claim that the offered price was too low cannot survive an
inquiry that depends on the facts; to allow such a claim to stand is ideology, not the fact
finding approach that that the Supreme Court seemed to mandate in Unocal.
In short, the Chancery Court took Unocal seriously and constructed a pragmatic
takeover jurisprudence. The sandbag came in Time Warner40 and Unitrin,41 where the
Supreme Court retreated to ideology. While one may criticize these decisions on a
variety of grounds,42 for present purposes their critical characteristic is that they
substitute an abstract principle for the court’s obligation to actually assess the facts of the
bid and response before them. In Time Warner, plaintiffs claimed that Paramount’s offer
– a cash offer for all outstanding shares, non-coercive because the minority would be
frozen out at the same price – could not support a defensive tactic that blocked
shareholder consideration. The court responded by simply accepting the target
company’s assertion that shareholders would mistakenly accept the bid; the court
demanded no evidence of why the shareholders would systematically err or why efforts
to educate them would fail. As Lipton boldly advanced in Takeover Bids, suspicion alone
was sufficient, without any factual inquiry into the likelihood or source of shareholder
error. This is ideology, not pragmatism; Burke not Holmes.
Any remaining uncertainty about the Supreme Court’s commitment to a factually
based proportionality test disappeared in Unitrin.43 In that case, the Chancery Court
simply determined that on the facts – among other things, the target already had a pill in
place – the creation of further defensive barriers could not possibly be proportionate to a
threat that had already been disarmed.44 As the Chancery Court put it, “because the only
threat to the corporation is in the inadequacy of an opening bid made directly to the
board, and the board had already taken actions that will protect the shareholders from
mistakenly falling for a low ball negotiating strategy, a repurchase program that
intentionally provides members of the board with a veto of any merger is not reasonably
related to the threat posed by [the bidder’s] negotiable all shares, all cash offer.”45
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The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, remanding to the Chancery Court to
determine whether the target’s repurchase program was “within a range of reasonable
defensive measures.”46 One might think that, had the Supreme Court accorded the
Chancery Court any degree of deference, it would have accepted the Chancery Court’s
finding that the repurchase program was not “reasonably related to the threat posed”
because the threat was so mild as implying that the defensive tactic fell outside a “range
of reasonable defensive measures,” as the Supreme Court’s reframed the Unocal
formulation in Unitrin. However, the opinion provides evidence that the Supreme Court
was rejecting the entire inquiry, as opposed to merely the factual conclusion.
Immediately following Unitrin’s direction on remand is a citation to, of all cases, Cheff v.
Mathes47 as in accord with the court’s conclusion. Cheff, it will be recalled, was a case in
which the Supreme Court declined to examine the board’s justification for defensive
tactics at all, and whose lack of content presumably gave rise to the need to address
defensive tactics in Unocal.48 Cheff also was the case Lipton cited in Takeover Bids to
support a broad grant of discretion to boards.49
So the Chancery Court was sandbagged. It was told in Unocal to apply an
intermediate standard, somewhere between the business judgment rule and the entire
fairness test, and make its own factual determination of whether a defensive tactic was
reasonably related to the threat posed by the particular offer as a trigger to whether the
board or the shareholders would resolve the fate of a hostile bid. Then in Time-Warner
and Unitrin it was admonished for doing precisely that. The Supreme Court’s and
Lipton’s ideology displaced the Chancery Court’s pragmatism.
But what was the Chancery Court to do then? Responding to the Supreme
Court’s direction in Unocal, Chancery had seen in a number of cases that target
companies systematically overreached on defensive tactics. Yet it was rebuffed by the
Supreme Court for following directions laid down by the Supreme Court itself in light of
the facts of the cases. It is easy to imagine the development of tension between the
appellate court’s pronouncement of abstract principles and a trial court’s observation of
the harsh facts of defensive tactics. In our view, Time-Warner and Unitrin created rather
than dissipated that tension. From time to time it resurfaces in response to particularly
egregious target company behavior, as in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,50 or in response to
46
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particularly exaggerated conduct by lawyers, as in the Chancery Court’s admonition in
Pure that “[i]f our law trusts stockholders to protect themselves in the case of a [noncoercive] controlling stockholder tender offer …, this will obviously be remembered by
advocates in cases involving defenses against similarly non-coercive third-party tender
offers.”51 For better or for worse, Lipton (and Takeover Bids) deserve both the credit
and the blame for this tension. Lipton ultimately persuaded the Supreme Court that the
problem of allocating discretion between the board and shareholders in hostile takeovers
could be resolved by abstract principles -- but only after the Chancery Court was so far
down the road to a pragmatic takeover jurisprudence that it could no longer turn a blind
eye to the facts.
III. Where Are We Now? Burke versus Schumpeter
It is now 25 years since Takeover Bids, 20 years since the Unocal/Household
International/Revlon trilogy, and 10 years since Unitrin. What standard governs target
management’s discretion to deploy defensive tactics now?
A familiar answer is that legal rules no longer matter. Over the period spanned by
these milestones, the capital markets have changed more dramatically than the law. A
majority of the outstanding stock of most public corporations is now held by institutional
investors. The voting policies of at least two large segments of those investors are
transparent. Large public pension funds openly challenge defensive tactics that, in effect,
go beyond the scope allowed as permissible by the Chancery Court in Interco. Review of
the voting policies of mutual funds, now available on each fund’s website, make apparent
that the policies of mutual funds on defensive tactics, though less public, do not differ in
substance from those of the public pension funds. It is not far fetched to claim that, were
a shareholder vote to be required, very few firms now could secure approval of a broadly
framed poison pill.
Put simply, the argument is that the capital market will no longer tolerate a just
say no defense, so whether the Delaware Supreme Court will allow it is irrelevant. So
posed, this analysis is a powerful counterpoint to that of Part II. There we acknowledged
that Lipton won the legal battle. While leaving the Chancery Court somewhat sullen and
potentially rebellious, the Supreme Court bought Lipton’s Burkean platform hook, line
and sinker – “just say no” survived at least rhetorically. Today, however, it is sometimes
argued that Lipton’s victory was a hollow one. As Chief Judge David Bazelon once
characterized a focus on the slogan rather than the outcome, “while the generals are
designing a new insignia for the standard, the battle is being lost in the trenches.”52
Which view is right?
This assessment requires looking a little harder at the types of takeovers involved.
The takeovers Lipton anticipated with such dismay in 1979 would be driven by outsiders
– Drexel’s development of the junk bond market to fund takeovers expanded the range of
both bidders and targets and, as a result, expanded the range of possible transactions. The
51
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new bidders were outsiders – think of the Rales brothers in Interco. The new targets
were old line companies who had become conglomerates – think of pre-takeover Revlon
having expanded into health care. And the new transactions involved breaking up the
target, in effect dismantling conglomerate organizations that proved to be inefficient.
Ron Perelman bought Revlon for $2.3 billion, and then sold off the health care and other
non-cosmetic businesses for $2.06 billion. He also received an offer for the remaining
cosmetic business of $905 million.53
What we saw, and what Lipton feared, was Schumpeter’s “perennial gale of
creative destruction.”54 For Schumpeter, the essence of capitalism is not the ordinary
competition that goes on within an existing industry structure – incremental changes in
prices, quality or products that leave the underlying marketplace unchanged. Rather,
economic progress comes from revolutionary changes that subvert the “ancient regime.”
As Schumpeter put it, “the problem that is usually being visualized is how capitalism
administers existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how it creates and
destroys them.”55 From this perspective, 1980s junk bond financed, bust up takeovers
reversed in record time a decade of bad acquisitions – outsider, not insider capitalism.56
And what of today’s hostile takeovers, those in which the market is said to render
defensive tactics irrelevant? At the risk of over simplification, these are Burkean
takeovers, strategic transactions involving market or product extensions effected by
establishment companies or, like Wachtel, Lipton’s unusual venture on behalf of a bidder
in a hostile takeover, ATT’s effort to revitalize its computer expertise by acquiring NCR.
If the 1980s hostile takeovers were the gale of creative destruction, today’s hostile
takeovers are just a process of peer review.
So where does that leave us? Did the market snatch back Lipton’s legal victory?
We fear not. The answer turns on a prediction about whether legal rules would trump the
market if the character of the bidder reverted to the outsiders of the 1980s. It is one thing
to see Oracle succeed in a hostile bid for PeopleSoft, quite another if the takeovers are
intended to restructure an entire industry from the outside. Steven Fraidin, a perceptive
and experienced observer of the takeover market, has argued, in effect, that Lipton has
won even if judicially sanctioned defensive tactics cannot block peer review takeovers.
The issue is Burke versus Schumpeter. For Lipton the problem is not hostile
takeovers, but only hostile takeovers that transmit the gale of creative destruction, that
represent a threat to the established order. Fraidin’s view is that incumbent managers
may be able to buck the market if the bidder is a genuine outsider, and that the legal rules
as envisioned, if not ever quite stated, by the Delaware Supreme Court, would give target
managers virtually unlimited discretion to just say no to whoever will be the new
millennium’s equivalent of T. Boone Pickens. Put somewhat differently, suppose
53
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outsider bidders like the Rales brothers sought to acquire a major corporation today. If
the consideration was partially junk bonds and the bidders had no experience running a
major corporation, would blocking the bid be within Untrin’s range of reasonableness
and would establishment directors be willing to take the heat from the market?
It may be that we will have the chance to learn the answer. A new generation of
takeover outsiders, in the form of hedge funds, appears to be on the horizon. The recent
bid for Circuit City by a hedge fund,57 as well as the reported heavy involvement of
hedge funds in the contest between Qwest and Verizon for MCI,58 may presage a replay
of the 1980s.59 And then the Supreme Court will have to consider its options yet again.
Will it line up with Burke and serve as the protector of the business aristocracy, or will it
make some room for the creatively destructive transactions that, for Schumpeter, were at
the core of a successful capitalism?
IV. Conclusion.
The decade from late 1970s to the late 1980s was a period of profound movement
toward the market in the culture, politics, and economics of America as well as the rest of
the world. In the United States, the resurgence of market-friendly values led to the
deregulation movement and contributed to the Reagan revolution in politics. In the wider
world, markets enjoyed a renaissance in the popular imagination during this period, with
the collapse of socialism in former Eastern-block countries and the spread of “creeping
capitalism” throughout the developing world. Much of this activity was truly
revolutionary. And one important aspect of the rise of markets in the U.S. was the surge
of hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts that washed away so many of the failed
conglomerates that had coalesced during the previous decade. This was “creative
destruction” in the best sense of the phrase.
As Burke knew full well, however, revolutions are profoundly unsettling not least
because their endpoints are difficult to predict. They can easily spill over from creative
destruction to what some would say is destruction pure and simple. The 1980s threatened
entrenched elites around the world. In some jurisdictions, the threat was fully realized.
Thus, entire generations of managers simply vanished in formerly socialist countries, as
the market restructured the economic landscape. In other jurisdictions including the
United States, surges in the market for corporate control were tamed and channeled after
they had achieved much-needed restructuring, but well before they could seriously
threaten the established economic elite. For better or worse, Martin Lipton – and the
positions first developed in Takeover Bids – played an important role in reigning in
market forces that were briefly unleashed during the 1980s. Few lawyers – and few
articles – have had anything like this effect. Burke would have approved.
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